A mailing list that adds a footer, an automatic forward, or a security gateway that rewrites the subject line: three common, perfectly ordinary moves, and all three invalidate the original DKIM signature and often break SPF alignment too. For a domain that has moved its DMARC policy to p=reject, the message then gets rejected or quarantined at the final recipient, even though it was entirely legitimate to start with. ARC (Authenticated Received Chain, RFC 8617) was built for exactly this case: each intermediary adds cryptographic proof of what it verified on the way in, so the last hop can rebuild the trust that got lost along the route.
The problem ARC solves, and the one it doesn’t
DMARC relies on alignment between the From header’s domain and the domain authenticated by SPF or DKIM. A mailing list that edits the body or subject invalidates the DKIM signature computed by the original sender; if it also re-sends the message from its own infrastructure, SPF alignment breaks as well. The message then arrives at the recipient authenticated as nothing at all, and the recipient applies the origin domain’s DMARC policy to the letter.
ARC does not fix that broken alignment and it does not replace DMARC: it adds a layer of attestation that states what the relay observed on the way in, and its identity. It is up to the final recipient to decide whether to trust that specific relay enough to soften strict DMARC enforcement when needed. That trust decision stays local to each mailbox provider.
The three headers that make up an ARC chain
Every intermediary that processes the message adds a set of three headers, numbered with an instance tag i= that increments at each hop.
| Header | Role | What it signs |
|---|---|---|
ARC-Authentication-Results (AAR) | Records the SPF/DKIM/DMARC result this relay observed on receipt | Not signed directly; its value is protected by the AS of the same instance |
ARC-Message-Signature (AMS) | Identifies the responsible relay and covers the message content, like a DKIM signature | The headers listed in h= and the body via bh=; never covers the ARC headers themselves |
ARC-Seal (AS) | Seals every AAR and AMS from all prior hops, in order | The ARC headers of every instance, not the message body; the only field carrying the cv= tag (chain validation: none, pass or fail) |
Reading an ARC chain on a real message
On a message that passed through a single mailing list, the final Authentication-Results header and the first ARC set look like this:
Authentication-Results: mx.recipient.example;
dkim=fail (body signature broken by the list) header.d=company.example;
spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=company.example;
dmarc=fail (p=reject) header.from=company.example;
arc=pass (i=1 spf=pass dkim=pass dmarc=pass) header.oldest-pass=1
ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; d=lists.example-business.example;
s=arc2026; t=1795000000;
b=TlCCKzgk3TrAa+G77gYYO8IHqyY0W06Qz3ScXchRwLCOtFz6...
ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
d=lists.example-business.example; s=arc2026; t=1795000000;
h=from:to:subject:date:message-id;
bh=2jUSOH9NhtVGCQWNr9BrIAPreKQjO6Sn7XIkfJVOzv8=;
b=oG5BtcdcDFbCj4hv6kUqlldYg9ZJcQXK5dkNHp7oM...
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.lists.example-business.example;
dkim=pass header.d=company.example;
spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=company.example;
dmarc=pass header.from=company.example
The arc=pass (i=1 ... header.oldest-pass=1) value in the final Authentication-Results shows that the validator walked the chain back to instance 1 without a break. That piece of information, combined with the sealer’s identity (d=lists.example-business.example), is what the recipient’s spam filter uses to decide whether to make an exception to a strict DMARC failure.
Who actually validates ARC chains today
Gmail, Microsoft 365 (Exchange Online Protection), and Yahoo/AOL have been able to read and generate ARC headers for several years now, the three providers with the biggest weight on consumer deliverability. But the decision to trust a given ARC sealer stays specific to each provider: there is no public, normative list of “trusted sealers,” unlike a published DNS zone. In practice, a large mailbox provider trusts a relay it recognizes as an established mailing list or messaging service far more readily than an unknown domain that just appeared.
cv=pass on a message it never actually authenticated properly. ARC shifts the trust question, it doesn’t eliminate it.Publishing and checking ARC headers on the sending and relay side
For a domain running its own mailing list or messaging gateway, setup follows three steps close to a standard DKIM rollout:
- generate a key pair dedicated to ARC sealing, separate from the usual DKIM signing key;
- publish the public key in DNS under its own selector;
- enable an ARC module on the outbound MTA (OpenARC for Postfix and Sendmail, or native support on most managed sending platforms).
; Public key used to seal outbound ARC messages
; (same mechanism as a regular DKIM key, under a dedicated selector)
arc2026._domainkey.lists.example-business.example. IN TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; " \
"p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC7vV..."
With Postfix, OpenARC installs as an additional milter, usually right after OpenDKIM in the processing chain, with an openarc.conf file referencing the same kind of key table as OpenDKIM: domain, selector, and the private key’s path. Teams that have already set up SPF, DKIM, and DMARC authentication already have most of the tooling in place; ARC adds one more signature in the same pipeline, not a parallel infrastructure.
ARC doesn’t restore a broken SPF or DKIM alignment: it passes along proof of what a trusted relay observed before it modified the message.
For domains that run no mailing list but receive mail through one, no configuration is needed on the receiving side: ARC validation is handled by the mailbox provider (Gmail, Microsoft 365, and so on), and its results show up in the Authentication-Results header on incoming messages. This matters most when tightening a DMARC policy: before moving to p=reject, cross-referencing DMARC aggregate reports (RUA) against the presence of arc=pass helps spot legitimate sources that go through mailing lists or forwards, rather than finding out after the fact through complaints.
Key takeaways
ARC replaces neither SPF, nor DKIM, nor DMARC: it fills the gap left by mailing lists and forwarding, two entirely legitimate uses that strict DMARC penalizes by design. The three-header set per hop lets a final recipient recover an authentication history that message modification would otherwise have erased, provided it trusts the relay that sealed it. For a domain heading toward p=reject, checking that the mailing lists its own recipients use actually generate ARC headers avoids a good share of the false positives that follow a policy tightening.
ARC is the kind of building block usually discovered backwards: a client flips DMARC to p=reject, their staff subscribed to a work mailing list suddenly stop getting messages, and someone has to trace the chain to realize the relay in question seals nothing at all. Checking for ARC on the main external relays now belongs on the pre-flight checklist for any DMARC tightening, right alongside reading the RUA reports — Simon Janvier.
Further reading: the full specification in RFC 8617 on the Authenticated Received Chain.
